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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND 
INDEMNITY COMP ANY, 







Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for benefits under the Uninsured 
l\Iotorists Coverage of an automobile insurance policy. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was heard in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, The Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Dis-
trict Judge, Presiding, on cross motions for summary 
.in(1;.?,"me>11t. The motion of plaintiff (Miss Lyon) was 
granted in part and denied in part. The motions of de-
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fendant and appellant (The Hartford) and Yosemite 
were denied. The Hartford appeals from the judgment 
denying its motion and granting Miss Lyon's. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Hartford seeks reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in its favor on its Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Miss Lyon was a passenger in a car driven by Bernie 
Alex Martinez when that automobile was involved in 
an accident caused by the joint negligence of Scott Gould 
Nickel and Robert G. Butcher in the operation of auto-
mobiles by them. (R. 2). Miss Lyon obtained a judgment 
against Nickel and Butcher in amount of $70,083.75. 
(R. l). 
Nickel did not have a nickle 's worth of liability insur-
ance. Butcher had liability insurance but the policy limit 
was $10,000. He paid $8,000 of that to Miss Lyon and 
$2,000 into court because of a claim by The Hartford 
that it was entitled to reimbursement of $2,000 paid under 
the Medical Payments Provision of its policy. (R. 1). 
Yosemite Insurance Company had issued an insur-
ance policy covering Mr. Martinez and the automobile 
in which Miss Lyon was riding at the time of the accident 
which policy provided Uninsured Motorists Coverage of 
$10,000. (R. 16). 
2 
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Yosemite refused payment initially, claiming that it 
was entitled to credit for the $10,000 paid by Butcher, but 
the trial court was not persuaded and Yosemite paid 
rather than appeal. (R. 138). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO AMOUNT IS PAYABLE UNDER APPEL-
LANT'S POLICY. 
This is an action in contract. 
The contract between the parties provides that any 
amount otherwise payable under the Uninsured Motor-
ists Clause shall be reduced by all sums paid on account 
of the injury by or on behalf of either the operator of 
the uninsured highway vehicle or any other person jointly 
or sc•yerall~, liable for such in;jur~T. The precise language 
of The Hartford's policy is: 
"COVERAGE D - PROTECTION AGAINST 
UNINSURED MOTORISTS: The company will 
pay all sums which the insured ... shall be legally 
entitled to recover as damages from the ... oper-
ator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of 
bodily injury ... caused by accident ... and aris-
ing out of the ... use of such uninsured highway 
vehicle." (R.42). 
* * * 
"LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
(C) The limit for Coverage D - Uninsured Mo-
torists stated in the declarations as applicable 
to "each accident" is the total limit of the com-
pany's liability for all damages because of bodily 
injuries snstained by one or more persons as the 
result of any one accident. 
3 
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Any amount payable under Coverage D -
Uninsured Motorists because of bodily injuries 
sustained in an accident by a person who is an 
insured under this coverage shall be reduced by 
(1) All sums paid on account of such bod-
ily injury by or on behalf of ( i) the owner or 
operator of the uninsured highway vhicle and 
(ii) any other person or organization jointly 
or severally liable together with such owner 
or operator for such bodily injury . . . " 
(R. 44). 
The limits stated m the declarations is $20,000. 
(R. 54). 
There was paid on account of this injury $10,000 on 
behalf of Butcher, a person jointly or severally liable 
with :Nickel, the uninsured motorist. (R. 138). 
The amount payable after application of the above 
provision, would therefore, be $10,000. 
However, the policy also provides that where the 
insured person (Miss Lyon) is occupying a non-owned 
automobile (Martinez) the Uninsured Motorists Cover-
age is excess over any other similar insurance available 
to such insured. The provision is : 
''OTHER INSURANCE: * * * 
"With respect to bodily injury to an insured while 
occupying an automobile not owned by the named 
insured, the insurance under Coverage D - Unin-
sured Motorists shall apply only as excess insur-
ance over any other similar insurance available 
to such insured and application to such automobile 
as primary insurance, and this insurance shall 
4 
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then apply only in the amount by which the limit 
of liability for this coverage exceeds the applic-
able limit of liability of such other coverage." 
(R. 44). 
The respondent was occupying an automobile not 
owned by her father or herself, but rather owned by Mar-
tinez. Similar insurance was available to her under 
Martinez' policy, namely, $10,000 of Uninsured Motor-
ist's Coverage provided by Yosemite Insurance Com-
pany. 
This clause is clear and unambiguous. Similar lan-
guage was held in Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d 157, 
417 P.2d 658 (H)66), to preclude recovery under both the 
owner's and the passenger's policy. In that case the pas-
senger's policy, issued by Factory Mutual provided: 
''Other Insurance.* * * 
With respect to bodily injury to an insured 
while occupying an automobile not owned by the 
named insured the insurance hereunder shall ap-
ply only as excess insurance over any other sim-
ilar insurarn.ce avwilable to such occupant, and this 
insurance shall then apply only in the amount by 
which the applicable limit of this part exceeds the 
sum of the applicable limits of liability of all such 
other insurance." (Emphasis added.) 
rrhe Supreme Court said: 
"Factory contends that its excess clause obli-
gates it to pay only that amount by which the 
limits of its policy exceed the limits of all other 
available insurance. If applied to the facts of this 
case, this contention would allow Factory to avoid 
all liability. In support of this position Factory 
5 
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cites Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 
8, p. 400: 
'* * * Where the owner of an automobile 
or truck has a policy \Vith an omnibus clause, 
and the additional insured also has a non-
ownership policy which provides that it shall 
only constitute excess coverage over and 
above any other valid, collectible insurance, 
the owner's insurance has the primary liabil-
ity.' " Russell at 660. 
The court adopted this view, saying: 
''The language is free and clear of ambiguity, 
that since the limits of [the passengers] policy 
did not exceed [the owners] excess coverage can-
not be applied to [the passengers] policy." p. 662. 
In this case, the Hartford undertook to make certain 
that Miss Lyon would receive $20,000 if injured to that 
extent by an uninsured motorist. Its undertaking was 
not to pay that amount in addition to sums received from 
other sources. On the contrary, its undertaking was to 
be reduced by sums received from other sources. 
In National Indemnity Co. v. Lead Supplies, Inc., 195 
F. Supp. 249, 255 (1960), it was said: 
"An insurance company, like any other ob-
ligor under a contract, cannot be held responsible 
for more than it became obligated to perform. 
Such obligations can only be determined from the 
insuring agreements.'' 
See also Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 
2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958). 
6 
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POINT II 
IN NO EVENT COULD RESPONDENT 
BE LIABLE FOR MORE THAN $10,000 IN 
THIS CASE. 
If we ignore the fact that Miss Lyon has recovered 
$10,000 from one of the wrongdoers, we have a case 
where the policy issued by The Hartford is excess and 
applies only in the amount which the limit of its liability 
($20,000) exceeds the limit of the other coverage 
($10,000) extended by Yosemite. The controlling pro-
VlSlOn lS: 
''OTHER INSURANCE: * * * 
"With respect to bodily injury to an insured 
while occupying an automobile not owned by the 
named insured, the insurance under Coverage 
D - Uninsured Motorists shall apply only as 
excess insurance over any other similar insur-
ance available to such insured and applicable to 
such automoblie as primary insurance, and that 
insurance shall then apply only in the amount 
by which the limit of liability for this coverage 
exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such 
other coverage." (R.44). 
:Miss Lyon was injured while occupying an automo-
hile not owned by her or her family. Other similar insur-
ance was available to her through Yosemite. That in-
surance is primary and The Hartford's can be liable 
only in the amount by which its limit ($20,000) exceeds 
Yosemite's limit ($10,000). Russell v. Paulson, supra. 
In 111 artin, et al. v. Christensen, et al., 22 Utah 2d 
415, 454 P.2d 294 (1969), the court had before it a pro-
7 
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v1s1on to the effect that no payment should be madC' 
which would result in a total payment in excess of tlw 
highest application limit of liability under two or mon' 
policies applicable to a loss. 
The company urged that the paragraph was designed 
to provide coverage under one policy and to avoid thC' 
effect of cumulative or multiple limits on a single acci-
dent where an insured has more than one policy and the 
premiums are based upon the total exposure of risk on 
the entire policy as written including the limitations. 
This court said : 
''There appears to be no ambiguity or uncer-
tainty in the provision just quoted. It being thus 
set forth as part of the insurance contract, in clear 
and understandable terms, that where the Com-
pany has issued more than one policy to an in-
sured, it will be liable only up to the maximum 
coverage of its highest limit on any one policy for 
any one accident or loss, it is the duty of the 
courts to give it effect. This is true unless con-
siderations of equity and justice, or of public pol-
icy, dictate that the contract should not be 
enforced because of fraud, duress, mistake, un-
conscionability, illegality or some other such co-
gent reason. No such considerations are present 
here.'' 
There is no way to sustain the lower court's judg-
ment tlrnt The Hartford is liable for $20,000 without 
writing a new contract for these parties. 
8 
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POINT III. 
IF APPELLANT HAS LIABILITY UNDER 
COVERAGE D - UNINSURED MOTORISTS, 
IT rs ENTITLED TO SET-OFF THE $2,000 
PAID UNDER THE MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
COVERAGE WITHOUT ALLOWANCE OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
It is uncontroverted that a recovery was made 
against one of the persons responsible for the accident. 
If The Hartford is liable to Miss Lyon under the Unin-
sured Motorist Coverage, that liability should be reduced 
hy the amount paid under the medical payments cov-
erage. 
The pertinent policy provisions are: 
"COVERAGE B-MEDICAL EXPENSE: 
The company will pay all reasonable medical ex-
pense incurred within one year from the date of 
accident for bodily injury caused by accident and 
sustained by the named insured or a relative ... '' 
(R.42). 
Subrogation: ''In the event of any payment under 
Coverage B - Medical Expense of this policy, the 
company shall be subrogated to all the rights of 
recovery therefor in which the injured person or 
anyone receiving such payment may have against 
any person ... " (R. 47). 
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers In-
su rarnce Exch., 22 Utah 2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969), this 
court held that such provision was valid. Judge Hall 
correctly awarded $2,000 to The Hartford but erron-
9 
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eously allowed attorneys' foes of $500 to .Miss Lyon's 
attorneys. 
There was no showing that Butcher's insurer was 
not willing to pay the limit of its policy to whomever was 
entitled to receiYe it. There was no showing that The 
Hartford accepted the benefits of Mr. J\IcRae 's efforts 
under circumstances implying an obligation to pay. Mr. 
l\IcRac was ackerse to The Hartford. 
To allow attorneys' fees in such a situation would 
he to subsidize Mr. McRae 's efforts to recover against 
The Hartford without either rule of law or contractual 
provision so pro\·iding contrary to the decision of this 
court in Blake v. Blake, 17 Utah 2cl 369, 412 P.2d 454 
(1966). 
CONCLUSION 
The Hartford's policy provides that if Miss Lyo11 
is i1ffolved in an automobile accident with an uninsured 
motorist and sustains injuries as a result, it will see that 
she cai1 collect any judgmrnt up to $20,000. She has col-
lected $20,000. This is the extrnt of Thr Hartford's 1111-
dertaking. 
This intent is expressrd hy clear and unambiguous 
language. The $20,000 limit is to be reduced by thr 
$10,000 received from Butcher's insurer. The applicable 
limit, as so amended, is $10,000. The coverage is excess 
over the $10,000 extended by Yosemite. Therefore, no 
amount is payable under The Hartford's policy. 
10 
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But if the court concludes that some amount is pay-
able, under no interpretation of the policy can this 
amount exceed $10,000 less the full $2,000 paid by The 
Hartford under its Medical Payments Coverage. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
and HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
7th Floor, Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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